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1 Introduction
Over the past while, a few of us have been chipping away at a question posed
by Howard Stein in his 1970 paper on Go¨del spacetime. Here is the question
(Stein 1970, 594).
Consider either an arbitrary given cosmological model, or a model
having the structure of one of the sorts assumed to hold in the real
world. Then: is it ((a) ever, (b) always) possible to introduce into
such a model a continuous deformation of the structure, leading
through intermediate states, all compatible with Einstein’s theory,
to a state in which Go¨del-type relationships occur?
A framework for investigating Stein’s question – often interpreted to be a
question concerning the possibility of ‘time machines’ – has been developed by
John Earman and others.1 I’ll be working within that framework today. I hope
to give a sense on where things stand in 2017 and articulate possible avenues for
future work as well. My thesis is three-fold. First, there is a sense in which there
are ‘time machines’ in general relativity. Second, there are ‘hole machines’ as
well. Finally, I will conclude that (so far) it seems the ‘hole machine’ advocate is
in a better position than the ‘time machine’ advocate. I will work to make clear
the content of these three claims. Regarding the third claim, let me suggest
at this stage that we refer to the time machine advocate as ‘Tim’ and the
hole machine advocate as ‘Hal’ to make things easier. These are just idealized
philosophers trying to make the case, as best they can, for the possibility of
their respective machines. We will have more to say about Tim and Hal – and
the tension between them – toward the end of the talk.
∗This paper was presented at The Philosophy of Howard Stein conference on June 9, 2017
at the University of Chicago. I thank the participants and attendees for valuable discussions
throughout the conference.
1See: Earman 1995; Earman et al. 2009; Earman et al. 2016; Krasnikov 2002, 2014, 2018;
Manchak 2009a, 2011a, 2013, 2014a; Smeenk and Wu¨thrich 2010.
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2 Preliminaries
Before we begin our discussion, I think it will be useful to outline some of the
basic structure of relativity theory we will need later on.2 General relativity
determines a class of cosmological models or spacetimes; each model represents
a physically possible world which is compatible with the theory. We take such
a model to be an ordered pair (M, g). The manifold M captures the shape
or topology of the universe and each point in M represents a possible event.
A number of two-dimensional manifolds are familiar to us: the plane, sphere,
torus, and so on. Here we see the cylinder which will be important later on.
a manifold
Note that any manifold with a topologically closed set of points removed also
counts as a manifold. For example, the sphere with the ‘North Pole’ removed
is a manifold. Manifolds are great for representing events in spacetime. But we
need more structure to represent how these events are related to each other. It
is the metric g which allows us to specify this extra structure. One of the jobs
of a metric is to assign a double ‘cone’ structure to each point in the manifold.
Some cones on a manifold might be more ‘narrow’ than others and some might
more ‘tilted’ than others. We only require than the cone structure vary in a
smooth way. Minkowski spacetime is the spacetime of special relativity; in
two dimensions, it is just the plane with a metric which does not change from
point to point. We will refer to Minkowski spacetime often in what follows. Of
course the cones have an intuitive physical significance. In general relativity, it
seems that ‘nothing can travel faster than light’; so there is an upper bound to
the speeds with which particles may travel. If we think of vectors at a point as
velocity vectors, then the cone structure demarcates that upper bound.
2The reader is encouraged to consult Hawking and Ellis (1973), Wald (1984), and Malament
(2012) for details. Less technical surveys of the global structure of spacetime are given by
Geroch and Horowitz (1979) and Manchak (2013).
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timelike, null, and spacelike vectors
Here, we see one of the cones – this one in three dimensions. Massive particles
must always have velocity vectors lying inside the cone. We call such vectors
timelike. Photons, on the other hand, must always have velocity vectors lying
on the boundary of the cone. Such vectors are called null. Finally, those vectors
lying outside the cone are called spacelike. Every cone has two lobes. In our
discussion today, we will assume that, ranging over the entire manifold, we can
label these lobes as ‘past’ and ‘future’ in a way that involves no discontinuity.
Such spacetimes are called time-orientable. Here we see a spacetime with a
Mo¨bius strip as a manifold; it fails to be time-orientable.
non-time-orientable spacetime
Let’s now review some basic definition concerning curves on the spacetime
manifold. A curve is timelike if all of its tangent vectors are timelike. In-
tuitively, a timelike curve ‘threads’ the cones at the points through which it
passes. Similarly, we can define null and spacelike curves. And we’ll say a
causal curve is one with tangent vectors everywhere timelike or null. A causal
curve is future-directed if all its tangent vectors are in or on the future lobes
of the light cones; a future-directed timelike curve represents the possible life
history of a massive particle. Let’s use the idea of a future-directed timelike
curve to define the ‘timelike past’ of a point. Consider a spacetime and fix any
point p in the manifold. The timelike past of p is the set of all points q such
that there exists a future-directed timelike curve from q to p; a point gets to
be in the timelike past of p if it’s possible for a massive particle to travel from
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the point to p. Here we see the distinctive ‘wedge’ shape of a timelike past in
Minkowski spacetime. The dotted lines indicate that the region is topologically
open. Similarly, we can define the causal past of a point. The timelike future
and causal future of a point are defined analogously.
a timelike past
Now an interesting feature of general relativity is that it permits ‘closed
timelike curves’ which allow for ‘time travel’ of a certain kind. A future-directed
timelike curve is closed if it intersects itself. Here, we see Minkowski spacetime
which has been ‘rolled up’ along the time axis allowing for a timelike curve to
wrap back on itself. We say a spacetime is chronological if it has no closed
timelike curves.
a closed timelike curve
Let’s now move to a few definitions concerning surfaces on the spacetime
manifold. A surface is spacelike if every every curve within the surface is a
spacelike curve. A set is achronal if it is not intersected more than once by
any timelike curve. A slice is a spacelike surface which is closed, achronal,
and without an ‘edge’; intuitively, a slice represents all of ‘space’ at a given
‘time’. Now, consider an arbitrary set S on a spacetime manifold. The domain
of dependance D(S) of S is the set consisting of those points q such that
every causal curve through q without endpoint intersects S. If ‘nothing can
travel faster than light’, there is a sense in which conditions on S will uniquely
determine the physical situation in D(S). Here, we see the domain dependence
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of a spacelike, achronal surface in Minkowski spacetime. Note its distinctive
diamond shape.
a domain of dependence
A spacetime which has a slice S such that D(S) is the entire manifold is said
to be globally hyperbolic. In such a spacetime, information on S will deter-
mine the physical situation in all of spacetime. Globally hyperbolic spacetimes
are causally well behaved; indeed it is a basic result that all globally hyper-
bolic spacetimes are chronological. Minkowski spacetime is globally hyperbolic.
Minkowski spacetime with one point removed from the manifold is not; the
causal curve without endpoint shown here does not intersect the indicated slice.
non-globally hyperbolic spacetime
Finally, we review spacetime extensions. We say that a spacetime is an
extension of some other spacetime if the second can be (properly) embedded
into the first while preserving the metric structure. A spacetime which has
no extension is maximal; otherwise, it is extendible. With the use of Zorn’s
lemma, one can show that every extendible spacetime has a maximal extension.
Finally, we say a spacetime is past-maximal if it has no extension in the past
direction. Consider the bottom half of Minkowski spacetime depicted here; it is
past-maximal but not maximal.
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a past-maximal spacetime
3 Time Machines
Now we’re prepared to talk about ‘time machines’. How does one characterize
this notion within general relativity? Let’s start by considering an extendible,
past-maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime. We might think of these models
as having, in the language of Stein (1970, 594), “the structure assumed to hold
in the real world” (so far). In what follows, let us say that such spacetimes are
starters. Now consider a ‘na¨ıve time machine’ definition. A starter is a na¨ıve
time machine if all of its extensions fail to be chronological. The intuition
behind the definition is straightforward. The starter represents a ‘physically
reasonable’ universe before the machine produces the closed timelike curves.
The requirement that all of its extensions fail to be chronological is supposed to
capture the idea that the future universe is ‘forced’ into allowing for time travel.
misner spacetime
Consider Misner spacetime. The manifold is cylindrical and the metric struc-
ture is such that cones ‘tip over’ as they move up the cylinder. There are no
closed timelike curves in the bottom half of this spacetime. But the top half
contains closed timelike curves through every point. The region below the dot-
ted line, taken as a spacetime in its own right, is a starter. Question: Is it
also a na¨ıve time machine? In other words, do all of its extensions fail to be
chronological? No.
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misner spacetime with ‘hole’
We can take Misner spacetime and cut a hole in the manifold so as to prohibit
closed timelike curves from forming. So, the bottom half of Misner spacetime is
not a na¨ıve time machine. In fact, there is a no-go result by Sergui Krasnikov
(2002, 2014, 2018) which shows that no spacetime is a na¨ıve time machine. To
be sure, this is a beautiful result. Still, its physical significance can be called
into question. Consider the following definition (Earman et al. 2016). A starter
is aP-time machine if (i) it has an extension with propertyP and (ii) every
extension with P fails to be chronological. Here, property P is used to pare
down the space of starter extensions to those which are “physically reasonable”
in some sense. We also must add condition (i) to our definition to avoid a
nuisance case: we do not want to consider a starter a P-time machine simply
because condition (ii) is vacuously true. Let’s now consider some candidate
properties.
4 No-Hole Properties
Recall that what seemed to keep the bottom half of Misner spacetime from be-
ing a na¨ıve time machine was the existence of an extension which had a ‘hole’ of
sorts which prevented any would-be closed timelike curves from forming. One
wonders if there is a condition to rule out the ‘hole’ in the example. There
certainly is. For sometime now, the condition of hole-freeness has been used
to rule out such spacetimes. Here is the formulation. We say a spacetime is
hole-free if, for every spacelike surface S, there is no metric preserving embed-
ding of D(S) into another spacetime such that the image of D(S) under the
embedding is a proper subset of the domain of dependence of the image of S
under the embedding. The intuitive idea here is beautifully simple: We require
that the domain of dependence of each spacelike surface be ‘as large as it can be’.
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non-hole-free spacetime
To see the definition at work, consider Minkowski spacetime with with one
point removed. Note that the domain of dependence in the mutilated spacetime
is not as large as it could be if the point were not removed; it is not the full
diamond shape. So, the spacetime is not hole-free. It has been suggested by
some experts that only hole-free spacetimes should be taken seriously. Here, we
have Bob Geroch on the matter (others such as Ellis and Schmidt (1977) and
Clarke (1993) take similar approaches).
“One might now modify general relativity as follows: the new
theory is to be general relativity, but with the additional condition
that only hole-free spacetimes are permitted” (Geroch 1977, 87).
We now have everything we need to formulate a precise question: Is there
a P-time machine if P is the property of hole-freeness? This is the central
question asked by Earman, Smeenk, and Wu¨thrich back in 2009. But 2009 was
a strange year with respect to the property of hole-freeness.
Let’s back up. In his 1977 paper on hole-freeness, Geroch claimed (without
proof) that Minkowski spacetime was hole-free. That same year it was claimed
(again, without proof) by Ellis and Schmidt that, not only Minkowski spacetime
but every maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime is hole-free. A proof of this
latter claim was eventually given by Clarke in 1993. Thus, it seemed that a
large class of ‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes were hole-free. But I was able
to show in 2009 that the claim of Ellis and Schmidt was actually false (and
that Clarke’s proof contained an error); there are many maximal and globally
hyperbolic spacetimes which have holes (Manchak 2009b). A few months later,
Krasnikov (2009) was able to improve my result. He did so by exhibiting a
bizarrely simple counterexample: Minkowski spacetime. In other words, he
showed that the spacetime of special relativity has ‘holes’ !
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minkowski spacetime
Here we see a spacelike surface (without boundary) in Minkowski spacetime
and its associated domain of dependence. Note that the boundary of the domain
of dependence – the dotted line – is not itself part of the domain of dependence.
But we can embed this diamond shaped domain of dependence into Minkowski
spacetime which has been ‘rolled up’ along the space axis. And we can do it
in such a way that the the domain of dependence of the embedded spacelike
surface now contains some of its boundary points. So it’s ‘larger’ than it was in
Minkowski spacetime.
‘rolled’ minkowski spacetime
The upshot is that the property of hole-freeness does not seem to be a ‘phys-
ically reasonable’ one. Where does this leave the situation with time machines?
Is there another property, more ‘physically reasonable’, which can rule out holes?
There is. Before we present the condition, let’s review a few facts concerning
timelike and causal pasts (analogous facts hold for timelike and causal futures).
First, note that, given any point in any spacetime, the timelike past of that
point is always topologically open. In Minkowski spacetime, the causal past of
every point is closed; but in general, the causal past of a point is not closed.
Consider Minkowski spacetime with a point removed.
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a non-closed causal past
We see that the causal past of the indicated point is neither open nor closed.
This suggests a new type of hole-freeness property. We say a spacetime is
J-hole-free if all causal pasts and futures are closed. Is this property more
‘physically reasonable’ than hole-freeness? We can breathe a sigh of relief since
we have a proof that Minkowski spacetime is J-hole-free; in fact, one can show
that all globally hyperbolic spacetimes – maximal or not – are J-hole-free (see
Hawking and Sachs 1974). It turns out that one can show that if P is J-hole-
freeness, there is a P-time machine (Manchak 2011a).
5 Hole Machines?
Let’s take a few steps back. What should we make of the time machine existence
result just mentioned? Consider again the bottom half of Misner spacetime.
the bottom half of misner spacetime
We know that some extensions are chronological. And we know that every
chronological extension has J-holes. Perhaps we ought think of the bottom
half of Misner spacetime as a ‘hole machine’ of a certain type? Consider the
following quite general ‘machine’ definition. A starter is a (P, Q)-machine if
(i) it has an extension with property P and (ii) every extension with P has
Q. As before property P is used to pare down the space of starter extensions
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to those which are “physically reasonable” in some sense. Property Q the one
intended to be ‘produced’ by the machine.
We see there is a (P, Q)-machine where P is J-hole-freeness and Q is
the failure of chronology. But also we have a (P, Q)-machine where P is
chronology and Q is the failure of J-hole-freeness. So which is it? Is the bottom
half of minser spacetime type of ‘time machine’ or type of ‘hole machine’? One
way to break the stale-mate is to investigate how robust the results are with
respect to different choices of the background class of ‘physically reasonable’
spacetimes. This turns out to be quite a project. Here’s why.
Suppose for some propertiesP and Q one finds there is a (P, Q)-machine.
It is important to note that one’s choice of P is, in general, crucial for the
existence result to go through: If P0 ⇒ P ⇒ P1 for some properties P0
and P1, there is no guarantee that either a (P0, Q)-machine or a (P1, Q)-
machine exists. The former is not guaranteed since P0 may be so strong that
the starter used to exhibit the (P, Q)-machine may not even have a ‘physically
reasonable’ P0 extension. The latter is not guaranteed either; if the class of
‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes is enlarged by P1, it is possible that the
starter used to exhibit the (P, Q)-machine may be such that one of its P1-
but-not-P extensions is not Q.
6 Robustness
How robust are the time machine and hole machine results mentioned in the
previous section? To aid our presentation a bit, consider the these property ab-
breviations: Let C, J, M, V stand, respectively, for the properties of chronology,
J-hole-freeness, maximality, and ‘being a vacuum solution’ of Einstein’s equa-
tion. This last property guarantees a ‘nice’ local metric structure; in particular,
if V is satisfied, so are all of the so-called ‘energy conditions’ which place con-
straints on the the distribution and flow of matter. Let’s now investigate the
robustness of the time machine result. We know that Misner spacetime is one
extension to the bottom half of Misner spacetime and we know that Misner
spacetime is J-hole-free, maximal, and vacuum. We have the following.
Proposition. There is a (P, Q) machine when Q is the failure of chronol-
ogy and P is such that (J & M & V) ⇒P ⇒ J.
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J&M&V
J
the space of spacetimes
Here is a picture to help show what’s going on. The entire space represents
the class of all spacetimes. The dotted lines represent possible subclasses P of
‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes. As long as P is smaller than the set of J
spacetimes but larger than the set of J & M & V spacetimes, the existence result
will go through. Outside of that, all bets are off. What about the hole machine
result – how robust is it? Once again, let us return to Misner spacetime. Let’s
remove a point from the boundary region between the top and bottom halves.
misner with hole and conformal factor
Next, we can multiply the metric by a positive smooth conformal factor –
here represented by the color gradient – which approaches zero as the missing
point is approached. The light cone structure remains perfectly unchanged: in
particular, it is still the case that the bottom half is a starter. But I claim that
any extension of this starter will have J holes. Consider any extension to the
starter. Because of smoothness considerations, it will fail to have the ‘missing’
point. Now consider any point in the extension which is on the boundary of the
bottom half; such a point will fail to have a closed causal past because of the
‘missing’ point. I also claim that one can find an extension to this starter which
is maximal and chronological.
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a chronological, maximal extension
Here is one. Start by considering the top half of Misner spacetime. We
then cut a vertical slit as shown. Next, we multiply the metric by a conformal
factor in such a way that it matches up smoothly with the bottom portion but
also goes to zero as the slit is approached. The result is chronological and is
maximal. We have the following result.
Proposition. There is a (P, Q) machine when Q is the failure of J-hole-
freeness and P is such that (C & M) ⇒P.
C&M
the space of spacetimes
Once again, here is the picture. As before, the entire space represents the
class of all spacetimes. The dotted lines represent possible subclasses P of
‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes. As long as P is larger than the set of C &
M spacetimes, the existence result will go through. Notice that, unlike the time
machine case, there is no outer boundary to constrain P. In other words, P
could be some universal property like ‘being a spacetime’ and the result would
go through. If you like, we have here a na¨ıve hole machine existence result. So
it seems we have a clear sense in which Hal, our hole-machine advocate is in
better position than Tim, our time machine advocate.
“But wait!” Tim might say. “That conformal factor used to construct the
starter in that example will likely make any starter extension ‘physically unrea-
sonable’ in the sense that its local metric structure will be badly misbehaved.
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In particular, the energy conditions won’t be satisfied.” This is good point. But
Hal has another trick up his sleeve. Consider, one final time, the bottom half
of Misner spacetime. We know that any chronological extension to this starter
has J-holes. How nice can we make one of its chronological extensions? Pretty
nice it turns out.
R(-1)L(-1) L(0) R(0) L(1) R(1)
a (C & M & V) extension
Consider an infinite number of copies of Misner spacetime indexed by the
integers and cut a vertical slit in each of them like so. Now, label the left and
right sides of the slits as I have done here. Finally, for each integer n, identify
the slit L(n) with the slit R(n+1). So the left slit in spacetime zero is identified
with the right slit in spacetime one; the left slit in spacetime one is identified
with the right slit in spacetime two; and so on. And so on in the other direction
as well. The result is a maximal, chronological, vacuum spacetime. Aside from
the having holes – which were ‘produced’ by the machine – the spacetime is
about as nice as one could demand. We have the following.
Proposition. There is a (P, Q)-machine when Q is the failure of J-hole-
freeness and P is such that (C & M & V) ⇒P ⇒ C.
C&M&V
C
the space of spacetimes
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Here is the picture. As long asP is smaller than than the set of C spacetimes
but larger than the set of C & M & V spacetimes, the existence result will go
through.
7 Conclusion
We have yet to identify a privileged class of ‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes.
Indeed, I have argued that we can never know such a thing (see Manchak 2011b).
But the way see it, Hal has the upper hand at the moment because – if you’ll
allow me a poker metaphor – it seems like there are just more ‘outs’ for Hal as
compared with Tim. We have three existence results on the table.
1. There is a time machine for P: (J & M & V) ⇒P ⇒ J.
2. There is a hole machine for P: (C & M & V) ⇒P ⇒ C.
3. There is a hole machine for P: (C & M) ⇒P
If the class of ‘physically reasonable’ spacetimes is relatively ‘small’, then both
Hal and Tim are in good position. Tim has result 1; Hal has result 2. There is
a strong symmetry between the two results and so, in this scenario, their hands
seem to be roughly equal in strength. But if the class of ‘physically reasonable’
spacetimes turns our to be relatively ‘large’, then Hal has result 3 as a sort of
ace in the hole.
You may do the accounting differently and that’s fine. The main point I
want to emphasize at the stage is that the game is far from over. Other ‘no-
hole’ properties besides J-hole-freeness could be considered here.3 And one
would like to see a systematic investigation of (P, Q)-machine results under
other ‘physically reasonable’ properties P. One wonders if the fortunes of the
Tim and Hal will remain consistent as we explore these possibilities.
References
[1] Clarke, C. 1993. The Analysis of Space-Time Singularities. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[2] Earman, J. 1995. Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[3] Earman, J., C. Smeenk, and C. Wu¨thrich. 2009. “Do the Laws of Physics
Forbid the Operation of Time Machines?” Synthese 169: 91-124.
[4] Earman, J., C. Wu¨thrich, and J. Manchak. 2016. “Time Ma-
chines,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Zalta (ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-machine/.
3See Minguzzi (2012) and Manchak (2014b) for a variety of definitions along these lines.
15
[5] Ellis G. and B. Schmidt. 1977. “Singular Space-Times,” General Relativity
and Gravitation, 8: 915-953.
[6] Geroch, R. 1977. “Prediction in General Relativity”, in J. Earman, C. Gly-
mour, and J. Stachel (eds.), Foundations of Space-Time Theories. Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 8. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 81-93.
[7] Geroch, R. and G. Horowitz. 1979. “Global Structure of Spacetimes,” Gen-
eral Relativity: An Einstein Centenary Survey, S. Hawking and W. Israel
(eds.), 212-293. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[8] Hawking, S. and G. Ellis. 1973. The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] Hawking, S., and Sachs, R. 1974. “Causally continuous spacetimes.” Com-
munications in Mathematical Physics, 35: 287-296.
[10] Krasnikov, S. 2002. “No Time Machines in Classical General Relativity.”
Classical and Quantum Gravity 19: 4109-4129.
[11] Krasnikov, S. 2009. “Even the Minkowski space is holed.” Physical Review
D, 79: 124041.
[12] Krasnikov, S. 2014, “Corrigendum: No Time Machines in Classical General
Relativity,” Classical and Quantum Gravity, 31: 079503.
[13] Krasnikov, S. 2018, Back-in-Time and Faster-than-Light Travel in General
Relativity. Springer International Publishing.
[14] Malament, D. 2012. Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and
Newtonian Gravitation Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[15] Manchak, J. 2009a. “On the Existence of “Time Machines” in General
Relativity.” Philosophy of Science 76: 1020-1026.
[16] Manchak, J. 2009b. “Is Spacetime Hole-Free?” General Relativity and
Gravitation, 41: 1639-1643.
[17] Manchak, J. 2011a. “No No-Go: A Remark on Time Machines.” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42: 74-76.
[18] Manchak, J. 2011b. “What is a Physically Reasonable Spacetime?” Phi-
losophy of Science, 78: 410-420.
[19] Manchak, J. 2013. “Global Spacetime Structure.” The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy of Physics, R. Batterman (ed.), 587-606. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[20] Manchak, J. 2014a. “Time (Hole?) Machines.” Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics 48: 124-127.
16
[21] Manchak, J. 2014b. “On Space-Time Singularities, Holes, and Extensions.”
Philosophy of Science 81: 1066-1076.
[22] Minguzzi, E. 2012. “Causally Simple Inextendible Spacetimes are Hole-
Free.” Journal of Mathematical Physics, 53: 062501.
[23] Smeenk, C. and C. Wu¨thrich. 2010. “Time Travel and Time Machines.”
The Oxford Handbook of Time, C. Callender (ed.), 577-630. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[24] Stein, H. 1970. “On the Paradoxical Time-Structures of Go¨del.” Philosophy
of Science, 37: 589-601.
[25] Wald, R. 1984. General Relativity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
17
